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Though widespread, the practice of public subsidies for cultural activity lacks a rigorous and 
consistent economic rationale. We analyze a canonical market structure that characterizes much 
cultural activity: the competition of mass-produced goods with heterogeneous non-standardized 
goods that are imperfect substitutes. We analyze several types of market failure: uncertainty 
about preferences (we don’t know what we like, and we don’t know what we might like in the 
future); endogeneity of preferences (we like what our neighbors talk about, and we like what 
we’re accustomed to); and externalities associated with production (future production costs are 
determined by current production). The model provides a basis for cultural subsidies to promote 
social welfare and economic development. 
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Public subsidy to cultural activity — ranging from the ﬁne and performing arts, to preser-
vation and promotion of traditional handicrafts and other forms of heritage, to cultural
industries like music and ﬁlm — is widespread in rich and poor countries alike. There is
nevertheless little explicit economic rationale for this feature of many countries’ public ﬁ-
nance. To be sure, there is general acknowledgment among economists who have addressed
the issue that there are likely to be positive externalities generated by cultural production
and consumption (Peacock 1969; Blaug 2001; Throsby 2001). This would serve as the justi-
ﬁcation for subsidy, but there is little analysis of the nature of these externalities.4 Indeed,
some have argued that their magnitude is probably small (Fullerton 1991). Moreover, to
the extent that such externalities are merely pecuniary — such as added proﬁts for caf´ es
and restaurants in the proximity of theaters and cinemas — there is little welfare-based
justiﬁcation for subsidizing cultural activity. We will argue in this paper that there is in
fact a strong theoretical case to be made for a cultural subsidy.
In this paper we provide a canonical model that characterizes some of the most salient
features of the market for various cultural goods and services: competition of mass-produced
goods (like Hollywood movies or the large-scale manufacture of textiles) with a wide array
of heterogeneous non-standardized goods (like auteur cinema or traditional handweaving).
We use the model to analyze a series of externalities and market imperfections. We consider
the case for subsidy of non-standardized goods that arises from three broad categories of
market failure.
First, there is uncertainty of preferences. Consumers do not necessarily know which variety
4Economic and political rationales for public support of cultural activity are reviewed usefully by a
number of authors, among them Benhamou (2001, ch. 5); Dapporto and Sagot-Duvauroux (2000, 257-
265); Farchy (1999, ch. 6); Farchy and Sagot-Duvauroux (1994, ch. 1); Heilbrun and Gray (2001, ch. 11).
On the relationship between culture and economic development, less has been written from an economic
perspective, but see Throsby (2001, ch. 4) and Rao and Walton (forthcoming). Various issues related to
cultural economics, but not necessarily closely related to the issue of the cultural subsidy that we analyze
here, are considered in the Symposium on cultural economics in the Spring 2003 number of Journal of
Economic Perspectives.
1of non-standardized good they like most. In our model, the probability that a consumer
will ﬁnd her most preferred variety increases with the level of production, and therefore
the availability, of the non-standardized varieties; this is an externality that ﬁrms do not
internalize. In addition, consumers are uncertain about what varieties of non-standardized
goods will be most preferred in the future (by themselves or their heirs). Cultural production
then has a value as a stock, and preserving some or all varieties can increase welfare — an
option-value argument. Firms do not internalize this intertemporal externality.
Second, preferences are endogenous in a very precise sense. Consumers like to consume what
their neighbors consume, in part because part of the value of cultural consumption lies in
the sharing of the experience; this refers to the case of network externalities. Preferences
are endogenous, then, in the sense that the level of utility associated with consumption of a
particular product is determined by the consumption choices of others. Preferences are also
endogenous to the extent that they are shaped by habit formation (or what some have called
an “addictive-good” aspect) and by expectations about future availability. Both types of
endogeneity can be inﬂuenced by aggressive marketing (which has economies of scale), and
so the larger producer (or the “sponsor”) may be able to lock-in our preferences. Finally,
addictive tastes of this sort may engender spill-over eﬀects, as when experience with one
good (e.g., the blockbuster movie Titanic), enhances the enjoyment of another, related good
(e.g., the Maritime Museum of the Atlantic in Halifax, Canada).
Third, there are externalities associated with production. Many cultural practices are sub-
ject to the mirror image of learning by doing: to wit, “forgetting by not doing”. More
generally, future production costs may be a function of current production levels; this is an
intertemporal production externality an individual ﬁrm may not internalize. Finally, some
producers may have “deep pockets”: this is the case of asymmetric ﬁxed costs (which may
be particularly related to marketing). Some of the small producers may face credit-market
imperfections and may not be able to cover the ﬁxed cost. This in turn may lead to the
disappearance of some varieties of goods, with welfare consequences for many consumers.
There are other arguments related to market failure and cultural goods. For example,
arguments about the existence value of the cultural stock are left out here. A rationale for
2my wanting some museum to be there, even though I (or anyone I care about) will never
visit it, must have something to do with a kind of cultural pride in its sheer existence. If
such a value exists, it provides a pretty straightforward argument for protection. We will
nevertheless suggest ways to model cultural pride — which is a form of public good —
related to self-esteem.
Concerns regarding the preservation of cultural diversity, or fears that globalization will lead
to a homogenization of cultural expression5 can be addressed with our model as instances of
market expansion. Roughly speaking, many apparently alarming scenarios have to do with
situations in which non-standardized goods production is suddenly exposed to competition
with mass-produced goods. It has been shown in the research on international trade that
there are situations where such competition might reduce social welfare (Dixit and Norman,
1980, 273-281; Francois and van Ypersele 2002); our paper complements these earlier results.
Our arguments for a cultural subsidy are equivalent to arguments for some form of protection
for certain non-standardized goods.
2 We don’t know what we like most
2.1 The basic model: mass-produced and non-standardized goods
Consider a market in which two types of imperfect substitutes, a-goods and b-goods, are
produced and sold. Each consumer consumes at most one unit of a given good. A conse-
quence of this assumption is that producers cannot practice discriminatory pricing based
on quantities. Consumers as a group can nevertheless consume several units of goods of
the same general type, a or b. Let b-goods be mass-produced goods: they are produced
by a monopoly ﬁrm and all such b-goods are perfect substitutes for each other. The total
5See the remarks made by French President Jacques Chirac in February 2003: “Si nous n’y prenions
garde, tout convergerait, faute de garde-fous, vers la r` egne du plus fort, ver le triomphe de ce qui est format´ e
` a l’avance pour le public le plus large, vers l’accroisement des in´ egalit´ es, vers l’aﬀrontement entre un mod` ele
dominant et le reste du monde.” “Jacques Chirac c´ el` ebre la diversit´ e culturelle,” Le Monde, February 4,
2003. Fears of the loss of cultural diversity are situated within a larger (economic) debate on globalization
in Bardhan (2003).
3quantity of b-goods produced is denoted qb.
The a-type goods, non-standardized goods, are not perfectly substitutable among them-
selves. By a-goods, we mean a wide variety of cultural products like art ﬁlms, various
handicraft traditions, the services provided by practitioners of particular musical styles:
Portuguese fado musicians and Moroccan nˆ ubˆ a musicians, for example, both provide musi-
cal services, but they have very diﬀerent characteristics that make those services imperfect
substitutes. Each consumer has a preferred variety among the set of all a-goods that can
possibly be produced. We consider the problem from the aggregate level and denote the
total number of a-goods produced by qa. The total measure of consumers is normalized to
one, and each consumer consumes at most one unit. In our model, the equilibrium will be
such that each consumer consumes exactly one unit, so that qb = 1 − qa.
2.2 Consumer surplus
Consuming one unit of the b-good provides the same utility ν to all consumers. A consumer’s
most preferred variety of a-good, on the other hand, provides her with utility ν + V . All
other varieties of a-goods are assumed to provide to the consumer the same surplus as the
mass product, namely ν. Consumers’ tastes are therefore heterogeneous in two respects:
they prefer diﬀerent varieties of a-goods, and they diﬀer in the absolute utility derived
from their preferred variety, V . V lies in the interval [0,1] and is distributed across the
population according to the cumulative distribution function Φ(·), with density φ(·).
In order to ﬁnd her preferred variety among the a-type goods, the consumer must incur
a ﬁxed search cost K; when she pays the cost K, she ﬁnds her preferred variety with
probability G(qa). The search cost K could be readily endogenized; for now, we appeal
to the informational value of advertising to justify this asymmetry between a-goods and
b-goods. No a-good producer will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to advertise its own product, since the
quantity sold will be too small compared to the ﬁxed cost of advertising. In contrast, the
b-good producer can cover this ﬁxed cost with large quantities.6 Suppose, for example,
6Another approach to thinking about K could be based on learning by consuming over time. Suppose
that a-goods are not the same in each period, while the b-good does not vary across time. Consumers who
4that the b-good ﬁrm produces a widely-distributed mail-order catalogue or maintains an
oft-visited Web site, but the a-goods producers do not.
An excellent example of search among the a-goods producers is provided by Baba Kharak
Singh Marg, a street in New Delhi (near Connaught Place) that houses a wide range of
cottage-industry producers from every state in India. Two features of this shopping experi-
ence merit attention: ﬁrst, centralizing the producers in one spot (a public-sector initiative)
lowers the search cost K; second, and perhaps more important, consumers entering this
emporium may have no prior knowledge of their most-preferred variety, but they have a
most-preferred variety nevertheless. We feel this second, “horizon-expanding”, feature is a
deﬁning characteristic of a wide range of cultural goods.
The probability that the consumer ﬁnds her most preferred variety G(·) can thus be inter-
preted as a cumulative distribution function, with support [0,1] and density g(·). A key
feature of this formulation is that G(·) is strictly increasing in qa: the larger the quantity
of varieties produced, the more likely that the consumer will ﬁnd her ideal variety. Con-
sumption of a-goods thus generates a positive externality, as a higher level of qa production
increases the probability that a given consumer will ﬁnd her preferred variety of a-good.
To simplify, assume that G(·) is the uniform distribution on [0,1], so that the probability of
ﬁnding one’s preferred variety of a-good when qa non-standardized goods are produced is
G(qa) = qa. The assumption of uniformity of G(·) involves no loss of generality, given that
the results obtained with a more general distribution function G(·), given some distribution
of valuations Φ(·), can be replicated with a uniform G(·) and some appropriate choice of
distribution of valuations ˜ Φ(·).7 Intuitively, a large number of consumers with a very high
valuation translates into higher demand. But a similarly shaped demand curve can also be
obtained if the probability of ﬁnding one’s perfect match increases quickly with qa. We will
also generally assume that the distribution Φ(·) of the additional valuation V derived from
have consumed the b-good in the past know its characteristics exactly, but the characteristics of a-goods
must be researched anew each period.
7Indeed, the demand for a-goods is determined by some composition of G(·) and Φ(·). If two pairs
(G(·),Φ(·)) and ( ˜ G(·), ˜ Φ(·)) generate the same demand when composed in this way, then they are equivalent
from the perspective of our model.
5non- standardized products is uniformly distributed on [0,1].
If a consumer incurs the search cost and fails to ﬁnd her preferred variety, we assume she
consumes another variety of a-good. The expected utility of a consumer is therefore
qa(ν + V ) + (1 − qa)ν − K − pa = qaV + ν − K − pa (1)
if she chooses to incur the search cost K, and ν − pb otherwise, where pk is the price8 of
a good of type k, k = a,b. All consumers will choose to consume one of the two goods as
long as consumption at one of the prices yields a positive utility. Thus qa + qb = 1.
2.2.1 Technologies
Goods of type b are produced by a monopoly; a-goods are produced by a continuum of
symmetric ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm in the a-continuum can produce at most one unit.
Note that by assuming a monopoly producer of b-goods, we are considering the case least
favorable to protection of industry a. A monopoly will tend to underproduce relative to
the competitive equilibrium, which is a good thing in this context (as in the case of a
polluting monopoly or of conservation of a resource used by a monopoly as an input to
some production technology).
Fixed costs are normalized to zero, and the marginal cost of production is ca for a-goods
and cb for b-goods. Proﬁts in the two industries are thus
πa(qa,pa,pb) = (pa − ca)qa
πb(qb,pa,pb) = (pb − cb)qb,
where ca > cb. Given our interpretation of quantity qa, ca may be seen as a ﬁxed cost
incurred by the (atomistic) ﬁrm producing a given unit, i.e., a given variety, of a-good. The
not-so-realistic assumption that mass production involves no ﬁxed cost is nevertheless the
least favorable case from the perspective of arguing for protection of industry a. Indeed,
8In what follows, we impose a single price for all a-goods; this is not a restrictive assumption in a
symmetric setting in which every a-good is similar except for the identity of the consumer who prefers it to
all others.
6a ﬁrm trying to cover its ﬁxed costs would typically increase production. In practice,
mass production entails large ﬁxed costs and very small marginal costs. This is the case,
for example, of the cultural industries — broadcasting, publishing, music recording, ﬁlm
production — in which the ﬁrst unit produced is extremely costly, but subsequent units
(additional screenings of a ﬁlm or pressing an additional compact disc) are virtually costless.
This feature can easily be incorporated in the model, and would strengthen our results.9
2.3 The optimum
Assume that the individuals who consume a-goods are those with the highest valuations for
their preferred goods, as would be the case in an eﬃcient outcome. Let V (qa) denote the
lowest additional valuation among consumers who consume a-goods. Then, with reference







(G(qa)V + ν − K)dΦ(V ).
Given our deﬁnition of V (qa), qb = Φ(V (qa)); thus, qa = 1−Φ(V (qa)). Using this relation,
gross consumer surplus can be expressed as a function of qa:




This expression simply says that gross consumer surplus is the basic utility enjoyed by all
consumers (ν), less the search costs incurred by consumers of some a-good ((1−Φ(V (qa)))K),
plus the additional utility of those fortunate a-good consumers who ﬁnd their most preferred
variety (G(qa)
R 1
V (qa) V φ(V )dV ). Social welfare, in turn, is given by gross consumer surplus
net of production costs. Assuming that a positive quantity of b-goods is produced, this can
be written as
SW(qa,qb) = (ν − cb)qb + qa ((1 − G(qa))ν − K − ca) + G(qa)
Z 1
V (qa)
(ν + V )φ(V )dV
9A ﬁxed cost F
b would be subtracted from ﬁrm b’s proﬁts and from social welfare. It may be the case
that production of a positive quantity of b-goods is no longer socially optimal once this cost is taken into
account.
7The ﬁrst term is the social welfare associated with b-goods production. The second term is
the social welfare associated with a-goods production (accounting for the base utility ν, as
well as search and production costs, but not the beneﬁts of ﬁnding one’s preferred variety).
The third term is the consumer surplus enjoyed by those a-goods consumers who ﬁnd their
most-preferred variety. This expression can be further simpliﬁed as a function of qa:
SW(qa) = ν − cb(1 − qa) − qa (K + ca) + qa
Z 1
V (qa)
V φ(V )dV (2)
Example: Uniform distributions. If the distribution functions Φ(·) and G(·) are uniform,
then qa = 1 − V (qa), and the expression for social welfare given in (2) can be rewritten as







In this case, the optimal quantity qa∗(1) maximizes SW and (from the ﬁrst-order condition
of the maximization exercise) is characterized by
cb − K − ca +
Z 1
V (qa∗(1))









(qa∗(1))2 + 2qa∗(1) − (K + ca − cb) = 0,







4 − 6(K + ca − cb)

,
provided that this solution is indeed less than 1, that is, if 4−6(K+ca−cb) < 1. Otherwise,
the optimal quantity is qa∗(1) = 1.
2.4 Equilibrium
2.4.1 Consumer demand
Consumers are atomistic; they make choices as though their decisions have a negligible
impact on the total amount produced. The total demand for a-goods is thus given by the
8measure of individuals whose additional valuation V for their preferred variety is higher
than the threshold ˜ V (qa,pa,pb), deﬁned by
G(qa)˜ V (qa,pa,pb) = pa − pb + K
Suppressing the arguments of ˜ V (·,·,·) for notational simplicity, net consumer surplus is
given by
CS(qa) − paqa − pb(1 − qa) =
Z 1
˜ V
(G(qa)V + ν − K − pa)φ(V )dV +
Z ˜ V
0
(ν − pb)φ(V )dV




with qa = D(qa,pa,pb) ≡ 1 − Φ(˜ V (qa,pa,pb)) in equilibrium.
Uniform distributions. If G(·) and V are uniformly distributed, then the marginal consumer
is represented by valuation ˜ V (qa,pa,pb) = 1
qa(K − (pb − pa)), when qa 6= 0. Total demand
for a-goods is then given by




K − (pb − pa)

.
In equilibrium, assuming that 1−4(K −pb +pa) ≥ 0, the quantity of a-goods demanded is







1 − 4(K − pb + pa)

,
when qa is strictly positive.10 This expression, in turn, can be solved for pb to give us the
inverse demand function for b-goods (as a function of qa, which is just 1−qb), taking pa as
given:
pb(qa) = (qa)2 − qa + (K + pa). (3)
2.4.2 Multiple equilibria and coordination
As is customary in models with strategic complementarities11, there are multiple equilibria.
10There is another solution for q
a, but it is increasing in p
a and decreasing in p
b, which does not correspond
to the speciﬁcations of a demand function.
11See, inter alia, Rosenstein-Rodan’s (1943) classic work on economic development, recently adapted by
Rodr´ ıguez-Clare (1993), or Cooper and John (1988), Bardhan and Udry (1999, ch. 16), Matsuyama (1993).
9Proposition 1 (a) There always exists an equilibrium in which no non-standardized goods
are produced (qa = 0).
If consumers anticipate no a-goods will be produced, they never incur the search cost K
and ﬁrms prefer not to produce any a-goods.
Moreover, the equilibria can be Pareto-ranked:
Proposition 2 An equilibrium in which only mass products are produced in positive quan-
tities is socially ineﬃcient.
Note that this result holds even if the b-goods equilibrium is unique.
Given that the consequences of multiple equilibria have been extensively explored in the
literature, we will focus in what follows on equilibria other than the one in which qa = 0.
In eﬀect we implicitly assume that agents are able to coordinate on the socially-eﬃcient
equilibrium, and we will not explicitly state for now that we assume that qa > 0. (In later
sections of this paper, we will return to the problem of multiple equilibria.)
2.4.3 Competition among ﬁrms
The atomistic ﬁrms in industry a are price takers. Thus they equate price and marginal
cost: pa = ca.
The monopoly chooses its quantity qb (or equivalently qa) taking into account the eﬀect on







In the case of uniform distributions, we can use the monopoly’s inverse-demand function
pb(qa) from (3). The ﬁrst-order condition to this program can be simpliﬁed as follows:
−3(qa)2 + 4qa −

1 + K + pa − cb

= 0,







4 − 3(1 + K + pa − cb)

, (4)
if this quantity lies in the interval [0,1]. If not, equilibrium quantity is equal to the nearest
boundary (0 or 1).
Proposition 3 Let producers in industry a price their goods at marginal cost. If |K −1| >
|ca−cb|, the equilibrium quantity of a-goods is always weakly lower than the social optimum:
ˆ qa(ca) ≤ qa(1). This result holds with equality (ˆ qa(ca) = qa(1)) if both quantities are corner
solutions and equal to one; otherwise, the inequality is strict.
The meaning of this proposition is that the demand for a-goods is ineﬃciently low: the
social value of an increase in qa is not internalized by consumers. Moreover, the tendency
of a monopoly to underproduce is insuﬃcient to counteract the ineﬃciently low demand for
a-goods as long as |K − 1| > |ca − cb|.
In order for the best-response of the monopoly to lead to the eﬃcient quantity qa(1), the
price of a-goods must be set at the level (call it pa(1)) that would induce the monopoly to
supply 1 − qa(1). This price pa(1) is given by
pa(1) = 2ca − cb + K − 1.
The question is whether pa(1) = ca or pa(1) < ca. The latter is true if and only if
(ca − cb) + (K − 1) < 0.
Now (ca − cb) > 0 by assumption, so this requires that K < 1, and indeed, that |K − 1| >
|ca −cb|. If this is condition is not met, then it is possible that the monopoly’s tendency to
under-produce b-goods just oﬀsets industry a’s tendency to under-produce a-goods. This
becomes less likely the larger is the cost diﬀerential between the two sectors of the industry
(that is the larger the diﬀerence ca − cb). Alternatively, the larger the search cost K, for a
given cost diﬀerential, the more likely that a-goods production is optimal. This immediately
gives the following result.
11Proposition 4 A subsidy to non-standardized production raises eﬃciency if |K − 1| >
|ca − cb|.
2.5 Asymmetric ﬁxed costs
What if we weaken the assumption that there are no ﬁxed costs? Suppose instead that
there are two sectors a and b with increasing returns to scale technologies (as is the case
in the cultural industries). The ﬁxed costs might particularly be related to marketing, as
in the case of ﬁlms. Then if there is an asymmetry in ﬁxed costs we might observe the
disappearance of a-producing ﬁrms in some equilibria. The asymmetry might arise if the b
ﬁrm covers its ﬁxed costs in other markets, for example, or if some a-goods producers face
credit-market imperfections and are unable to cover the ﬁxed cost.12
3 We don’t know what we may like in the future
What if current production creates a stock of “culture” or “crafts-diversity”, for example?
Then arguments made regarding the economics of biodiversity conservation (e.g., Heal 1998)
apply more or less to cultural goods of the type we are considering here. Uncertainty
regarding the future value of goods is without doubt a central characteristic of cultural
goods. There is furthermore an enduring sentiment among the cultural cognoscenti that
today’s consumers are unable to appreciate fully contemporary cultural products. This
was recognized by Beethoven, who, when told that audiences didn’t like his latest Quartet,
said,“C ¸a leur plaira bien un jour” (Massin and Massin 1976) — roughly, “they’ll learn to
like it”.
Formally, suppose that there are two periods to the model presented above. The quantity
consumed in the second period is just the level produced (and consumed) in the ﬁrst period.
(We assume no loss between periods.) There is no production and ﬁrms play no role in the
second period. Social welfare in period 2 is a function of ﬁrst-period outputs qa and qb
12The question of deep pockets and predation is analyzed in a seminal paper by Aghion and Bolton (1987).
12only, and, for simplicity, is assumed to be separable in the two quantities: W(qa) + H(qb).
Moreover, since b-goods are perfect substitutes, it is logical in this context to assume that
an additional unit of b-goods yields a negligible stock surplus. As soon as production is
greater than zero, future consumers beneﬁt from the existence of the good, and there is no
(or nearly no) need for larger quantities. Mathematically, the marginal welfare for b-goods
is null for qb > 0:
H(qb) = h, if qb > 0,
= 0, otherwise.
W(qa), on the other hand, is concave in qa. In practice, of course, not all a-goods will have
value for future consumers. Nevertheless, there is suﬃcient uncertainty regarding which of
these products will have value to justify our modeling approach.
3.1 The optimum
The optimal output levels qa∗ and qb∗ = 1 − qa∗, assuming both are strictly positive, solve
the following program:
max
qa SW1(qa) + ρ(W(qa) + h),
where ρ is the discount factor. The ﬁrst-order condition to this program yields
cb − K − ca +
Z 1
V (qa)
V φ(V )dV + qaV (aa) + ρW0(qa) = 0.




(qa)2 + 2qa − (K + ca − cb) = ρW0(qa).
The higher the marginal value of a-goods in the future (that is, the higher is ρW0(qa)), the
larger the optimal level of current production.
3.2 Underproduction of a-goods in equilibrium
Consumers choose current consumption levels qa and qb without taking into account the
second period because they are atomistic. Their demand function in the second period
13is therefore identical to the ﬁrst-period demand function. Likewise, ﬁrms in industry a
behave no diﬀerently in this two-period model than in the static case analyzed earlier. The
monopoly does not internalize any of the value constituted by the stock of a-goods in the
second period, and chooses its quantity exactly as in the one-period model.
Proposition 5 The equilibrium in the ﬁrst period when cultural goods constitute a stock
valued in the second period is identical to the equilibrium derived in the one-period case. As
such, the underprovision of a-goods is accentuated in the two-period model by the additional
value of these goods in the second period.
3.3 Sponsorship
In the two-period model considered above, consumers value the continued existence of a-
goods independently of whether they consume it today or not. This may be an existence
value or an option value. In either case, expectations about the future matter. Now
suppose that b-goods production is “sponsored” (in the sense of Katz and Shapiro (1986)):
the b-producing monopoly is able to sell at a price below marginal cost in order to drive
out competition. We are emphasizing one feature of sponsorship here: namely, that it
might inﬂuence consumers’ expectations about future availability of the good (or repairs, or
software, etc., that are compatible with the good). One question raised by the coordination-
game framework is why any population of players would ever play the Pareto-dominated
b-goods equilibrium? Perhaps, in a more complicated game, because they do not expect a-
goods to be available in the future, and prefer not to make a relationship-speciﬁc investment
in a-goods today.
This also suggests that one might be able to attribute a sponsorship rationale to aggressive
cultural policy-making. (This might include French cultural policy, for example.) Such
culture ministries might be inﬂuencing consumers’ expectations regarding future availability
of domestic cultural goods, and reducing the cost of relationship-speciﬁc investments.
Whether or not there are relationship-speciﬁc investments or network externalities, spon-
sorship may play a role in equilibrium selection in any setting where there are potential
14coordination failures. If the sponsorship is public (the French cultural policy example),
then the role of a cultural subsidy is not the standard Pigovian correction of price signals,
but a mechanism for coordinating agents on the Pareto-superior equilibrium.
3.4 Costs of storage and probability of future use
Weitzman (1998) provides a fairly general model for application to the optimal conservation
of biological (e.g., species) diversity. The argument is suﬃciently abstract that it is readily
applicable to the question of conserving cultural diversity (see, e.g., Farchy and Sagot-
Duvauroux (1994, 29)). Weitzman provides a rigorous derivation of a simple ranking formula
for deciding how to allocate a given conservation budget:





Species (i) are given a rank (Ri) according to their expected marginal distinctiveness (Di),
the direct utility they provide (Ui), weighted by the feasible change in survival probability
(∆Pi) per unit of cost (Ci).
In our model, the survival of a particular variety of a-good can be assured by incurring cost
ca in the ﬁrst period, and by assumption this cost is the same for all varieties. Similarly,
the change in survival probability purchased with cost ca is identical for all varieties. Then
the ranking criterion reduces to the ﬁrst term in brackets above. Weitzman’s U captures
the direct utility of consuming a given variety, which is equal to ν + V for those fortunate
consumers that value that variety most, plus ν for the frustrated consumers who unsuc-
cessfully sought another type of a-good and settled on this variety: direct utility can be
succinctly summarized by the sum of ﬁrst- and second-period social welfare associated with
the consumption of a given variety.
The expected distinctiveness of a given variety is a more complicated concept. In discussions
of biological diversity, Weitzman argues that certain species (or habitats) are distinctive
because they contain genetic information not available in other species. Diversity is captured
by the amount of unique genetic information in a given species, weighted by the probability
that the species will not become extinct: the distinctiveness of a species is the marginal
15change in diversity achieved by an improvement in the survival probability.
The question is then whether, if the a-goods were ranked according to Weitzman’s formula,
there would be a longer list of surviving varieties in the second period under the social
optimum than there would be under a competitive equilibrium. This is equivalent to show-
ing that marginal diversity is higher for the lowest-ranked variety under the competitive
equilibrium.13
A further question is the likelihood that a given variety will be useful in the future. For
creative endeavors, this is (to put it mildly) diﬃcult to forecast. Critically useful inputs,
created in the past, to contemporary creation often come from very unlikely and hard-
to-predict sources. A celebrated example is the inﬂuence of African ceremonial masks on
Picasso (as in the ﬁgures of his Les demoiselles d’Avignon (1907)). This is even more
complex than the “amount of genetic material” present in a species under consideration for
conservation.
4 We like what our neighbors talk about
Part of the spillovers from cultural consumption take the form of network externalities.
Boardman and Hargreaves Heap (1999) incorporated network externalities into an analysis
of access to satellite broadcasting in essentially this sense: people talk about shared expe-
riences. The greater the number of people that share an experience, the more valuable it
is. This extends beyond the number of proximate individuals to whom a person can talk
about a sports broadcast, for example; if the audience for a given event is suﬃciently large,
it generates media reviews and other coverage from which the consumer derives a beneﬁt
(and she would not beneﬁt if she hadn’t shared the experience.) Sable and Kling (2001)
model the beneﬁts from shared experience of cultural heritage; they correctly note that
many of these beneﬁts are essentially public goods, but not necessarily network eﬀects. The
13This would require more structure to be imposed on the problem: namely, we would need to explicitly
consider the a-goods continuum as a line (so that a distance metric could be employed to capture the idea
of distinctiveness), and we would need to know something about the relative willingness to pay for certain
points on the a-goods continuum.
16very simple point of this section is that Pareto-dominated collective cultural choices can
easily emerge as equilibrium outcomes.
The basic idea can be illustrated with a two-player coordination game. Suppose that each
player simultaneously chooses a cultural good — a ﬁlm, say. Each can choose only one, and
there are two choices available: as before, a mass-produced b-good, and a single a-good. As
in the basic model, the a-good provides utility ν + V to each player, and the value of V
need not be equal for each player.
Player 1’s utility function is given by u1(m,k), where k ∈ {a,b} is the type of ﬁlm chosen
by player 1, and m ∈ {1,2} is the number of players who choose k. An intrinsic part of the
good’s appeal to both players is that it serves as the basis for conversation; it is a shared
experience on the basis of which the players can talk about values or gossip or other things.
We assume therefore that there are network externalities in consumption, borrowing the
deﬁnition of network externalities from Farrell and Saloner (1985): uj(2,k) > uj(1,k),∀j,k.
Both players, independent of the outcome, prefer the a-good: uj(m,a) > uj(m,b),∀j,m.
Then if uj(2,b) > uj(1,a),∀j, there are two pure-strategy equilibria to this simple game:
[a,a], which is a Pareto optimum, and [b,b], which is strictly Pareto-dominated by the ﬁrst
equilibrium.
Following the network-externalities model of Katz and Shapiro (1985), for n > 2 players
preferences can be expressed in terms of the following willingness-to-pay function:
ν + 1(a) · (V + va(qa)) + 1(b) · vb(qb)
where 1(a) is an indicator equal to one if the agent’s choice is k = a, and similarly for 1(b),
and the quantities qa and qb also serve as the expected size of networks a and b. Then ν+V
is the agent’s willingness to pay for the a-good when the a-network size is zero, and ν is her
willingness to pay for the b-good when the b-network size is zero.
The v functions capture the idea of network externalities: let vk(0) = 0, v0
k > 0, v00
k < 0,
limx→∞ v0
k = 0, k = a,b. Furthermore, assume that vf(x) < vd(x),∀x ≥ 0. In the extreme,
suppose that vb(x) = 0,∀x ≥ 0.
Then, just as in the two-player illustration, this is a coordination game, and two results can
17be derived.
Proposition 6 When there are network externalities in cultural consumption, (a) there are
multiple equilibria; and (b) the equilibria can be Pareto-ranked.
5 We like what we know
5.1 Addiction
In many cases, the utility derived by consumers of cultural goods exhibits increasing
marginal returns. Indeed, consumers learn to appreciate cultural goods when they con-
sume more. They are more likely to pick the “right” good, the one closest to their tastes,
when they have a better knowledge, through consumption, of the goods oﬀered. One can
therefore see cultural goods as “addictive” goods, and represent the utility they generate by
a function that is convex in the quantity of cultural goods consumed (Becker 1996; Becker
and Murphy 1988; Pollak 1970; Stigler and Becker 1977).
In this instance of endogenous preferences, as in the case of network externalities analyzed in
the previous section, nothing in our model is inconsistent with the position taken by Stigler
and Becker (1977) to the eﬀect that preferences are stable and exogenous, but that subtle
shadow prices — like the price of music appreciation — change with consumption patterns.14
14An account of the evolution of tastes and sensitivities is given by musicologist Barry Kernfeld (1995,
128). Kernfeld reports his experience with John Coltrane’s experimental jazz performance Ascension (1965):
Colleagues organizing a freshman music seminar once asked me to suggest a jazz recording
that might be played with other types of radical music as a point of departure for asking the
questions: What is noise, and what is music? I suggested Ascension. Not having listened to
the piece for about four years, I cued it up on the record player and found it to be perfectly
coherent, emotionally powerful, and in its own way beautiful. In those four years I had gained
such a better understanding of jazz that Ascension now seemed a poor choice for the seminar,
because it was obviously music and hence did not raise signiﬁcant questions about boundaries
between music and noise. That same day, my colleagues came to say that they had decided
not to use Ascension, because it was clearly noise, not music!
18Whether tastes in fact change (i.e., preferences are truly endogenous) or the costs of certain
types of consumption change (as Stigler and Becker would have it), the analysis of social
welfare in typical comparative-statics exercises is complicated. Nevertheless, some welfare
comparisons can be made, and that is what we do in this section.
5.2 “Genre-speciﬁc” investments
The addictive aspects of cultural consumption can be understood in another way, one that
is related to a second kind of network externality. The network externality described in
Section 4 above is basically the communication externality studied by Katz and Shapiro
(1985), that exhibited by physical networks like telephone or fax-machine networks. A
second kind of network externality (Katz and Shapiro 1994) is exhibited by the hardware-
software paradigm. In a more complicated model of cultural consumption, consumers might
choose a or b every period for many periods, but the goods are not the same each period.
One gets “used to” Hollywood movies, or to auteur cinema: your relationship-speciﬁc in-
vestment in appreciating one genre is the hardware, the ﬁlm is the software.15 Then, even
despite the network externalities, a more complicated model could admit lock-in eﬀects
with relationship-speciﬁc investments. The question then is whether, in any single stage of
the repeated game, the unanimous a-consumption outcome ceases to Pareto-dominate the
unanimous b-consumption one if the latter is played often enough. As is typical in cases
of path-dependency, in an equilibrium in which consumption of b-goods predominates, con-
sumers might acknowledge that the a-goods outcome is Pareto-superior, but no (or few)
individual consumers would unilaterally to a-goods because of the switching costs associated
with acquiring a taste for the a-goods.
A key feature of this logic is that production of a-goods might ineﬃciently cease in equi-
The interested reader can consult the recording on Impulse! Records AS-95 (1965), reissued on compact disc
in 2000.
15An old-fashioned book on art criticism (Venturi 1945) is based on the idea that repeated exposure to
certain styles of painting reduces the viewer’s objective status as an art critic, as he or she cannot help
but respond more enthusiastically to what is familiar. This is just the ﬁne-arts analogue of the case we are
making regarding relationship-speciﬁc investments in ﬁlms or music.
19librium. The following results can arise as a consequence. (i) There are path-dependent
equilibria that can be Pareto-ranked: in a repeated game, all consumers might end up
consuming the b-good in equilibrium, even though all would prefer to be consuming their
most-preferred a-goods. (ii) If consumers make decisions about relationship-speciﬁc invest-
ments based on their forecasts of future availability of the goods in question, they might
well opt for b-goods even if they can ﬁnd their most-preferred a-good, if, roughly, they fear
that the a-good will not be around long enough for them to amortize their investment.
(iii) As noted in Section 3.3, ﬁrms (or culture ministries) can “sponsor” particular goods
(a-goods or b-goods) in the sense that they (try to) inﬂuence consumers’ expectations about
the future survival of (and hence the desirability of making relationship-speciﬁc investments
in) those goods.
5.3 Cross-product externalities
Using a Lancaster(1966)-style “characteristics” approach, consumers’ tastes can be modeled
as evolving toward certain clusters of goods: this, too, can be associated with the disap-
pearance of particular varieties of a-goods. Learning to like some genres — investing in
appreciation of a style or variety — may spill over into a consumer’s preferences for entirely
diﬀerent kinds of cultural products. When, a few years back, the Hollywood blockbuster
Titanic was released, hordes of movie-crazed fans descended upon the Maritime Museum of
the Atlantic in Halifax, Nova Scotia (which houses, inter alia, bona ﬁde deck chairs from the
ill-fated vessel). Nothing about the museum’s holdings or its mission toward the public had
changed; but the experience of consuming a particular cultural product — the movie — had
increased some viewers’ demand for the service provided by the museum. (This is a kind
of externality if only because director James Cameron receives no royalty payment from
the Museum’s increased revenues; our interest, however, lies in the cross-product spillovers
within a given consumer’s preferences.)
205.4 Cultural pride
Akerlof and Kranton’s (2000) paper on identity draws attention to, among many other
things, a peculiar externatity of social identities: when one group member deviates from
a socially-ordained code of conduct, it reduces the utility of the non-deviating members of
the group.16 Akerlof and Kranton characterize this as a form of anxiety. Certain kinds of
cultural activity, we propose, can generate cultural pride as a sort of mirror image of this
anxiety. Namely, some cultural activity by one member of a reference group can raise the
utility of other members of the group. What else is cultural pride but a sort of self-esteem?
Economic research on self-esteem (e.g., B´ enabou and Tirole 2000, 2002) has tended to focus
on the its instrumental role in enhancing motivation (which may have positive or negative
consequences, depending on whether it induces overconﬁdence). In the case of cultural
pride, the more relevant eﬀect is the increase in utility associated with a positive shock to
cultural pride.
6 Forgetting by not doing
In Section 3 above, we considered one intertemporal externality of cultural activity: cultural
goods produced today may have a stock value in the future. There is a second kind of
intertemporal externality, this time a feature of production. For many kinds of cultural
production, the concern is not solely one of preserving the stock of production, but also of
preserving the process of production. It is not enough that there exist compositions for the
small accordion from Russia and Ukraine known as the bayan (such as those by Russian-
German composer Soﬁa Gubaidulina): it may be desirable to ensure that the whole process
of producing the instrument, and the training of new players by current players, is preserved.
16Of course, much cultural consumption is an exercise in providing visual markers of one’s social identity:
attending a performance of opera or speed-metal music signals to others something about the reference group
to which you wish to belong. This intersection of cultural consumption and identity, however, lies largely
outside the scope of this (already too ambitious) paper. In particular, such signaling of identity generates no
obvious externality, except in the sense noted in the text, that refusing to abide by the agreed-upon system
of signs and consumption can create anxiety among the other members of the reference group.
21A stark version of this problem arises if future production is impossible without current
production, or to put the matter another way, if future production costs are a function of
current production costs. Consider the two-period setting of Section 3. Suppose, however,
that ﬁrms continue to produce in period 2, and that past output levels aﬀect current output
levels through intertemporal economies of scale. More precisely, the production technology
for a-goods exhibits some “memory loss”: if a given type of a-good is not produced in the
ﬁrst period, the knowledge of how to produce it are partially lost, and it becomes much
more costly to produce it in period 2. For example, perhaps workers are no longer trained
in a particular production method and the stock of human capital needed for production
decreases. This is formally equivalent to a learning process in which the current cost of
producing a good is a decreasing function of past production (see, e.g, Fudenberg and
Tirole 1983).
At the same time, the disappearance of a particular variety of a-good reﬂects a deprecia-
tion of human capital; the social stock of human capital may not be replenished. In this
sense, understanding much artistic creation is aided by the distinction made in other con-
texts between codiﬁed and tacit knowledge in technological progress. (See for example, the
extensive discussion in Evenson and Westphal (1995), who insist upon the importance of
the “tacitness and circumstantial sensitivity of technology”.) Production of many cultural
goods, including musical performances and handicraft production, relies upon just such
circumstantial sensitivity or tacit knowledge. Were this not the case, it would be a simple
enough matter to make a tape recording of a master artisan giving instructions that could
be played at any point in the future. As with failed instances of technological transfer
to developing countries, such codiﬁable knowledge is insuﬃcient to permit the recipients
(those listenting to the tape recording, in this case) to replicate the technology in question.
This is a market failure because apprenticeship — the training process whereby a bayan
player becomes a master musician or a weaver becomes a master artisan — cannot be sold
or licensed with the ease of a patent or a set of blueprints (or any other form of codiﬁable
knowledge).17
17This process bears a strong resemblance to the phenomenon, emphasized long ago by Marx, of “de-
skilling” of cottage-industry artisans in the face of industrialization; see, e.g., the discussion of “Replacement
22Denote second-period production of k-type goods by xk, k = a,b. We say there are learning
eﬀects if the cost of second-period production of a-goods is a decreasing function of the
ﬁrst-period level of output: C(xa,qa) ≡ γqaxa, with
∂C(xa,qa)
∂qa = γxa ≤ 0. The assumption
of learning eﬀects captures the importance of transmitting skills and educating new workers.
To simplify, we assume that the utility of consumers is the same in both periods. When
there are learning eﬀects, social welfare in the second period is




When V is uniformly distributed, this can be written







6.1 The optimal outcome
The optimal output levels qa∗(2), xa∗, qb∗, and xb∗ (assuming that production of b-goods is
positive in both periods), solve the following program:
max
qa,xa SW1(qa) + ρSW2(xa,qa)
(where the “2” in the superscript denotes that this is a 2-period model, in contrast to the
optimal amount qa∗(1) in the one-period model of Section 2).
In the case of uniform distributions, and using (5), the ﬁrst-order conditions yield:
cb − (K + ca) + 2qa∗ −
3
2
(qa∗)2 − ργ(xa∗)2 = 0




(An explicit solution requires the solution of a polynomial of degree 4.)
6.2 Strategic distortions by the monopoly in equilibrium
When production continues in the second period, strategic distortions might arise as a result
of ﬁrst-period behavior by the monopoly producer of b-goods. Using backward induction,
of Labour by Machinery”, in Marx (1863).
23we can ﬁrst solve the monopoly’s second-period problem. The problem is identical to the
one-period problem:
max
xa (pb(xa) − cb)(1 − xa),







4 − 3(1 + K + pa − cb)

,
(This corresponds to (4), the response function derived for the one-period case.) Recall
that the cost of producing quantity xa in the second period depends on qa. If a-producing
ﬁrms price their good at their marginal cost, then pa = γqa. By increasing its ﬁrst-period
output qb = 1−qa, the monopoly can therefore aﬀect the second-period output of a-goods,
and hence increase the residual demand it faces.
A rational monopoly will choose its ﬁrst-period price pb to solve
max
pb πb(1 − D(pa,pb)) + ρπb(1 − ˆ xa(γqa(pb))),
which can be rewritten in terms of quantity, as before:
max
qa (pb(qa) − cb)(1 − qa) + ρpb(ˆ xa(γqa)) − cb)(1 − ˆ xa(γqa)).
The ﬁrst-order condition of the program can be written as:
∂pb(qa)





∂ˆ xa (1 − ˆ xa) − pb(ˆ xa) + cb
!
= 0
If there were no externality of mass production in the ﬁrst period on second-period costs,
the ﬁrst-order condition would be
cb = pb (qa) −
dpb
dqa (1 − qa) (6)






∂ˆ xa (1 − ˆ xa) − pb(ˆ xa) + cb
!
= pb (qa) −
dpb
dqa (1 − qa) (7)
The term ρ(dˆ xa/dqq)(···) is negative: dˆ xa/dqa > 0, and all of the terms in brackets are
negative as long as pb > cb in the second period. (This in turn is always the case as long
24as mass products are produced in the second period.) Hence the right-hand side of (7)
is lower than the right-hand side of (6): pb(qa) − (dpb/dqa)(1 − qa) is lower than if there
were no externality, implying that qa is lower. In other words, the b-goods producer strate-
gically distorts its ﬁrst-period production upwards. This is summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 7 When second-period costs of a-goods production are a declining function of
ﬁrst-period levels of a-goods production, the b-good monopoly increases ﬁrst-period output
in order to increase the residual demand it faces in both periods.
Note that there are two eﬀects at work here: the distortions introduced by monopoly in
the b-goods market, and the intertemporal externality whereby current b-goods production
negatively aﬀects future a-goods production. It is chieﬂy the second of these eﬀects that is
of interest.
7 Concluding remarks
We have shown that market failures beset production and consumption of cultural products,
and under the circumstances, public subsidy could therefore raise eﬃciency and welfare. We
showed this in a canonical market in which a mass-produced good competes with a wide
range of imperfectly-substitutable non-standardized goods. In such a setting, there are at
least three types of market imperfections. There is uncertainty of preferences, as consumers
are neither sure ex ante of their most-preferred type of non-standardized good, nor of the
value such goods might have in the future, to consumers or their heirs, or both. There is
endogeneity (or at least path dependence) of preferences, as both the habit-forming and the
essentially social character of cultural consumption can aﬀect outcomes. Third, there are
production externalities, as future production costs may be a function of current production
levels.
Our approach is consistent with the view that culture contributes to economic develop-
ment, where development is understood in the sense advocated by Sen (1988, 1999), as an
25enhancement of people’s capabilities. Cultural activity, whether by preserving a diversity
of choices, or by forming tastes, broadens people’s choice sets as well as their sophistication
in making such choices.
Public subsidy can improve eﬃciency and welfare for at least two reasons: it can provide
incentives to increase production of desired goods and services, but it can also serve as
a coordinating device in the case of multiple equilibria, leading agents toward a Pareto-
superior outcome. Our results speak to two policy arenas in particular: debates surrounding
public support for cultural activity at the national, subnational, or local levels; and to
international eﬀorts to preserve or promote cultural diversity. (An example of the latter
is UNESCO’s recently established list of masterpieces oral and intangible heritage, such as
the Sosso bala music of Guinea or the Korean ancestor ritual known as Jongmyo Jerye;
see Nas (2002).) We have said little about the form that public support should take (e.g,
grants, tax breaks, regulation, etc.). Many debates about the desirability of public support
for the arts and culture ultimately hinges upon political-economy arguments that we do not
consider here.18
Nevertheless, many such public supports for cultural activity, whatever their form, would
likely run afoul of a particularly strict reading of World Trade Organization rules on in-
ternational trade and investment. For this reason, many governments (France and Canada
notable among them) have advocated that cultural activity be removed from emerging WTO
rules, an initiative that has largely been opposed by the United States and in particular
by the US motion-picture industry (Acheson and Maule 2003). Others would argue that
even with the market imperfections that characterize cultural activity, free trade is supe-
rior to subsidies. In a persuasive book, Cowen (2002) argues that international trade in
culture tends to generate more exciting forms of cultural expression, even in poor countries
and low-technology environments. His framework is not inconsistent with ours; for Cowen,
18Nor do we consider the eﬀect, which exercises many commentators, that public support might have on
the content of creative expression. This concern, oft-voiced by conservative critics of public support for the
arts, is raised by many non-conservative artists and arts administrators regarding the Blair government’s
attempt to make arts policy a branch of apparently progressive social policy in the 1990s; see the compilation
by Wallinger and Warnock (2000).
26the increased foreign demand for Haitian paintings or Navajo blankets plays essentially the
same role as a subsidy does in our model. Cowen nevertheless acknowledges that once a
tradition disappears (like classical Persian carpetmaking), even the presence of potentially
lucrative foreign demand cannot bring it back; a subsidy to prevent this forgetting-by-not-
doing could raise welfare even in this setting. This suggests that a promising next step in
our research would be to explore the particular conﬁguration of parameters under which
trade protection would or would not raise welfare.
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